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CASE NOTES
veillance as reasonable." 7 In his dissent in Berger,
Mr. Justice White asked the crucial question:
If electronic surveillance is a 'general search',
or if it must be circumscribed in the manner
the Court now suggests, how can surreptitious
electronic surveillance of a suspected Com-
munist or a suspected saboteur escape the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment?"8
It is suggested that such surveillance can not
escape the dictates of the Constitution unless the
Court is prepared to create classifications of crimes
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment-a
position apparently without legal precedent." 9
As this comment has sought to emphasize the
need for discriminating and narrowly circumscribed
safeguards in any interception of wire and oral com-
munications, it would appear that an even higher
standard is necessary to conduct an electronic
surveillance without an order in an emergency
situation. There is good reason for this. The
ability to intercept for forty eight hours without
"
7 Id. at 363-64.
118 338 U.S. 116.
"1 In a case currently before the Supreme Court,
Butenko v. United States, 4 Cr.L. 4053, the oral
argument revealed the issues involved in national
security cases. To the Solicitor General's explanation
that the new law [1968 Safe Streets Act] is written in
very general terms and provides that a wiretap, in
national security cases, may issue whenever authorized
by the Attorney General, Mr. Justice Black inquired
"Are you relying on a Congressional rule, and not the
constitution?"
an order is overly permissive, for while any evi-
dence obtained would be in violation of the Act
and therefore excluded, its worth as an investiga-
tive tool for "leads" and corroborative information
might justify misuse of this provision. It is difficult
to envision situations in which such an "emer-
gency" could exist without sufficient time to secure
a court order.
CONCLUSION
The above examination of those parts of Section
2518 which relate to the Supreme Court decisions
in Berger and Katz indicates that the validity of
several provisions will depend on the restraint of
investigative officials. The serious crime problem
in this country demands that instruments neces-
sary for law enforcement be fully employed. Never-
theless, the possible abuses inherent in such sophis-
ticated practices as electronic surveillance require
that specific limitations be imposed. Congress has
sought to provide these standards by closely follow-
ing the requirements set down by the Court in
Berger and Katz. But serious constitutional ques-
tions are raised by those provisions allowing sur-
veillance in emergency situations, issues about
which the Court has given little direction.
Police abuse of the provisions of Section 2518, or
irresponsibility in carrying out its procedural
scheme, could lead the Court to establish more
rigid and severe requirements for eavesdropping, a
development that could spell the end of electronic
surveillance as an effective law enforcement tool.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Exclusionary Rule Held Applicable To Civil
Commitment Procedures For Narcotic Addicts-
People v. Moore, 446 P. 2d 800 (Calif. S.Ct. 1968).
The defendant was arrested for possession of
heroin. He was taken to a jail infirmary and
examined by a doctor. As a result of this examina-
tion, a petition was filed to commit him as a
narcotic addict or as a person who is in imminent
danger of becoming addicted to narcotics. At the
trial he was found to be in imminent danger of
becoming a narcotic addict and committed to a
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rehabilitation center. He appealed the order of
commitment asserting the illegality of his arrest.
Before examining whether there was illegal
conduct on the part of the arresting police officers,
the court considered the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to the civil commitment proce-
dures. The court found that the trial closely
approximated a criminal proceeding in that the
state was the defendant's opponent, the proceeding
was commenced on petition of the district attorney,
the defendant was entitled to be present at the
hearing and to be represented by counsel at all
stages of the proceeding, and, finally, that the
defendant's liberty was at stake. Since the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitu-
tional methods of law enforcement so that the
state will not profit from its own wrong, the rule
was held to be applicable to a civil commitment
proceeding.
The court rejected the argument that the
narcotic addict proceedings, being for the benefit
of the addict, does not benefit the state. It felt
that while the proceedings were in part for the
benefit of the individual, it also involves a loss of
his liberty which is meant to benefit society as
well. The close identity to the aims and objec-
tives of criminal law enforcement was sufficient
for the court to hold that the unconstitutionally
obtained evidence of withdrawal symptoms while
in custody, if admissible in these proceedings,
would furnish an incentive to violate the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The court then examined the conduct of the
arresting officers and found that their detention
and questioning of the defendant was without
justification. The evidence was then excluded,
resulting in insufficient proof to sanction the
commitment. Similarly, the testimony of the
doctor regarding his examination of the defendant
was held to be "fruit of the poisonous tree" and
was also excluded. As a result, the commitment
order was reversed.
Search Conducted By A Private Citizen In
Conjunction With Police Without A Search War-
rant Is Illegal-Stapletom v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Calif. S.Ct. 1968).
Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to suppress
certain evidence discovered in his automobile by
a private agent and later seized by a police officer
with whom the agent was working. Police and
the agent, an employee of Carte Blanche, were
in the process of arresting petitioner for credit
card fraud pursuant to a valid arrest warrant
when the private agent asked if anyone had
searched petitioner's car which was known to be
parked some distance down the street. Receiving
a negative reply from someone he went to the car
to look for evidence related to the credit card
violations. While searching he discovered 60 tear
gas cannisters in the trunk and notified police
who seized the evidence. Petitioner was subse-
quently charged with possesing a tear gas cart-
ridge in violation of the California Penal Code
and sought to have the evidence excluded because
of the illegal search.
The court admits that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule does not apply to searches by
private individuals, but pointed out that the
discovery here by a private agent was part of a
joint operation by police and the credit card
agents. In Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927), city police, then not subject to the Fourth
Amendment, conducted an invalid search by
federal standards, in conjunction with a federal
prohibition agent. The court held it a joint opera-
tion and excluded the evidence because of the
participation of a federal agent. In the case at bar,
the court concluded that the participation of the
police similarly infected the evidence uncovered
by the private agent and required that it be sup-
pressed. See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787 (1966).
In addition, the court refers to Moody v. United
States, 163 A.2d 337 (D. C. Mun. App., 1960),
which held that a police officer standing silently
by knowing that a private citizen was appro-
priating evidence of a criminal violation must be
deemed to have participated in the seizure, ren-
dering it illegal. Here the police failed to protect
petitioner's constitutional rights by impliedly
consenting to the private agent's action. The
result from this approach also is that the evidence
so obtained must be suppressed.
Affidavit Insufficient To Establish Probable
Cause-Wiles v. Commonwealth, 163 S.E. 2d 595
(Va. S.Ct. 1968). On appeal the defendant, who
was convicted of the illegal possession of narcotics,
claimed that his motion to suppress the evidence
of the narcotics found on his premises was im-
properly overruled. The court, three justices
dissenting, found that the warrant authorizing
the police to search the defendant's residence was
issued without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
1969]
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and of a Virginia statute. Accordingly, the case
was reversed and remanded.
The affidavit supporting the warrant recited
the following as material facts constituting proba-
ble cause:
1. Information from informant who has given
reliable information in the past that Henry
Wiles residing at this address has narcotics
in his possession at this time.
2. This Division has received several com-
plaints that this man is a user of drugs.
Relying on Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964),
and other cases involving search and seizure, the
Virginia court found that the affidavit was merely
conclusory and did not inform the magistrate of
the underlying circumstances on which the in-
formant based his conclusions. There is no specifi-
'ation of what "information" was received or of
whether it was based on personal knowledge of
the informant or of when the past information
was given by the informant. In addition there
was no indication of when the "several complaints"
were received or of whether any informant or
complainant had ever seen the defendant using
drugs.
CONFESSIONS
Retroactive Application of Miranda In State
Court-Commonwealth v. Learning, 247 A.2d 590
(Pa. 1968). A homicide was committed in Pennsyl-
vania on February 4th, 1965. Defendant was
arrested on February llth in New Jersey on the
pretext of a parole violation. Actually, he was
suspected of committing the homicide. He was
incarcerated until March 2nd, when he was re-
moved to Pennsylvania where he was held until
the preliminary hearing on March 10. During
this entire period the defendant was interrogated
by the police, was refused counsel, was encouraged
to show the police the location of the decedent's
body, and was persuaded to make a complete
confession. His conviction was reversed by the
court.
The court held that although the events com-
plained of occurred prior to the decision in Miranda
v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), its guidelines
are nonetheless applicable to the instant case.
Citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966),
the court found that all trials which began subse-
quent to Miranda are bound by its decision.
Thus, the New Jersey authorities had the duty
to advise the defendant of all his Constitutional
rights, and to permit him to secure counsel. Since
this was not done, all evidence secured by the
police prior to March 10, 1965, including the
finding of the victim's remains and the written
confession, was constitutionally inadmissible.
No Miranda Warnings Required For Refusal
To Be Inducted Into The Army-United States
v. Kroll, 402 F. 2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1968). Appellant
reported to the United States Army induction
center but refused to take the one step forward
which symbolizes entrance into the armed forces.
He was asked to leave the room while the other
men finished their induction process. Upon the
appellant's return to the room, the presiding offi-
cer read to him in front of two witnesses the Army
penalties for refusing to be inducted. Appellant
would not step forward. He also refused to sign a
statement that he refused to be inducted. He
contended at trial that all evidence which re-
ferred to the events after the first time he refused
to step forward should not be admitted because the
presiding officer did not at that time give him the
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
The court upheld the conviction on two grounds.
First, since the crime is not committed until the
second time the registrant refuses to step forward,
appellant was not in custody after his first refusal
to step forward, and therefore, the Miranda
rationale does not apply. The appellant did not
confess while in custody to a crime previously
committed.
Second, the facts of the case do not warrant
the conclusion that the warnings should have been
given either before or after the final refusal to
submit. In Noland v. United States, 380 F.2d
1016 (10th Cir. 1967) the registrant was con-
fronted at trial by his statement that "I refuse
to be inducted ...." That court rejected his plea
for Fifth Amendment protection because "a
person is not entitled to counsel while he is com-
mitting a crime". The instant case was stronger
against the defendant, since there was no state-
ment being offered into evidence and, therefore,
no problem of self-incrimination.
Confession Made In Solitary Confinement
Held Inadmissible-Townsend v. Henderson, 405
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1968). Defendants made an un-
successful attempt to escape from Fort Pillow
Prison Farm in Tennessee. One defendant, a 19
year old illiterate who had been imprisoned for
two years, confessed while in solitary confinement
and on the day after receiving a head wound
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which had rendered him unconscious. The latter
took the stand as a witness, but denied making
the confession.
Defendants appealed from a denial of habeus
corpus. The Sixth Circuit held the admission to be
prejudicial error. The confession was involuntary
because, following Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936), there existed at least a threat of
punishment. Defendant lacked a free choice
because, at least in his mind, the warden, who
interrogated him, " ... bad complete power to
cause his removal from the dark cell or to keep
him there indefinitely". Answering the contention
that maintenance of prison discipline required
his placement in solitary confinement, the court
stated that such was relevant only to the concerns
of penologists and sociologists and did not affect
the legal issue.
Evidence Obtained From Accused Rapist After
He Expressed Desire To Remain Silent Is Ad-
missible-Commonwealth v. Marsh, 242 N.E.2d
545 (Mass. 1968). On Aug. 23, 1965, one day after
a reported rape, defendant, who was at a Boston
police station on an unrelated matter, was asked
by an officer if he was the operator of an auto-
mobile whose passengers included the victim.
He replied in the affirmative. The officer then
gave him the required constitutional warnings.
After responding to several more questions the
defendant expressed a desire to consult an attorney
before answering further. On the way to a cell
the officer asked whether the undershorts he had
on were the ones he was wearing the night before.
The defendant replied affirmatively, and upon
request of the officer, gave them to him.
The question and response given before the
warnings were admitted improperly but the court
construed it as harmless error because the de-
fendant repeated it on the stand.
At the voir dire the trial judge ruled that the
conversation about the shorts after defendant
invoked his right to remain silent was inadmissible
and also ordered that the undershorts be sup-
pressed.
At trial the judge modified his order by allowing
prosecution, while cross-examining the defendant,
to display the shorts and interrogate the defendant
about them. Defendant did not identify them as
his and prosecution was precluded from inquiring
about the excluded conversation.
Defendant, on appeal contended, inter alia,
that the display of the shorts to the jury was error,
especially in light of the fact that the victim had
previously testified that she had bled on the night
of the rape. The court disagreed saying that any
garment worn by defendant at the time of his
arrest may be properly seized and admitted into
evidence. While they conceded that the prosecu-
tion's interrogation did make indirect use of the
excluded conservation, it was deemed not prej-
udicial because the defendant did not identify
the item as his.
Confession Of 17 Year Old Given After Miranda
Warnings Held Inadmissible-In Re Rambeau,
72 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968). Defendant, a seventeen
year old, was adjudged guilty of purchasing,
possessing and smoking marijuana, and declared
a ward of the juvenile court. The sole basis for
the court's conviction was the confession of the
defendant given while in detention after he had
received the Miranda warnings. On appeal, the
conviction was reversed on the grounds that the
arrest itself having been illegal, the confession of
guilt could not be separated from the unlawfulness
of the detention and was therefore inadmissible.
While noting that the illegal detention did not
ipso facto render any confession obtained during
such detention inadmissible, the court held that
here the confession was "fruit of the poisonous
tree".
The trial judge found that the defendant's
statement was voluntary and satisfied the require-
ments of the Escobedo-Dorado-Miranda decisions.
However, the court said " ... compliance with the
requirements of warning in the cited trilogy of
cases is not enough to settle the matter, at least
in a case involving a minor". The following factors
were determinative of the court's holding that the
Miranda warnings were not sufficient to justify
the kind of interrogation which was undertaken:
1) no attempt was made to contact the boy's
parent while he was being held; 2) no attempt was
made to take the defendant before a probation
officer before interrogation; 3) the generality of
the questioning was offensive in its invitation to a
confession of guilt of any sort.
LuNEups AmD OTHER IDENTITICATION
PROCEDURES
Guidelines Announced For In-Court Identifica-
tions Independent Of Tainted Pre-Trial Identifica-
tion Procedures-Clemons v. United States, 4 Cr.L.
Rptr. 2221 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has interpreted the standards announced in
19691
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United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), and has reaffirmed
the use of independent in-court identification
made by witnesses who had viewed the defendant
at improperly conducted lineups. The court held
that as long as an in-court identification has
sources independent of the tainted proceedings,
it is not suppressible.
Clemons consisted of three companion cases. In
the first, Hines v. United States, the defendant
was convicted for the robbery of a beauty parlor.
The identification testimony of three witnesses
was questioned at trial. The first witness had
talked to the robber when he entered the shop.
Later, she examined photographs and identified
the defendant; when she was taken to the de-
fendant's cell two and one-half weeks after the
robbery she again identified him as the robber.
The second witness heard but did not see the
robber. In the defendant's cell-block she was able
to identify him after hearing his voice. The third.
witness had also seen the photographs but was
unable to identify the defendant until she saw
him at the preliminary hearing.
The district court held that the identification
at the preliminary hearing did not violate due
process, that the cell block identifications were a
denial of due process, and that the first witness
could be permitted to identify the defendant in
court while the second could not.
The circuit court upheld the lower court on
each of its holdings. With respect to the pre-
liminary hearing identification, the court noted
that the presentment occurred on the morning
after the arrest, that there were over 100 people
in the court room at the time of the identification,
and that the witness' attention was in no way
drawn to the defendant. However, the court said
that such a practice is "fraught with peril to a
degree suggesting its sparing use .... "
The court based its finding of a denial of due
process in the cell block identification on the fact
that the defendant was alone in custody and
standing in a screened off section when the witness
saw him. Furthermore, two other witnesses present
at the confrontation indicated that the defendant
was the robber at the time the witness in question
was making her identification. The court said,
"... in taking the situation in its totality the
confrontations were unnecessarily suggestive".
In also affirming the district court's determina-
tion that the first witness could testify to the
robber's identity while the second could not, the
court relied on the following facts: (1) the first
witness had seen the robber once prior to the
robbery as well as during the robbery itself; (2)
she testified that she paid particular attention to
his appearance; (3) she had been able to pick out,
the defendant's photograph on the night of the
robbery. The second witness, on the other hand,
was unable to pick out the defendant's photograph
on the night of the robbery and could not identify
the defendant before going to the cellblock. Thus
her testimony was "certainly the product of the
illegal confrontation".
In Clark v. United States, the defendant was
convicted of the armed robbery of a liquor store.
The owner and an employee were in the store at
the time. A few hours after the robbery the owner
and employee were shown a number of photo-
graphs, at which time they both tentatively identi-
fied the defendant. A few weeks later the defendant
was invited to the police station by a detective
he knew. The owner was called to come in and
identify a suspect, but was told nothing else.
While the defendant was in the squad room, with
his feet up on a desk and talking on the telephone,
the owner entered and identified him as the robber.
He was arrested and charged. The next day the
employee identified the defendant at the detention
area at which the defendant was held.
The circuit court affirmed the district court's
holdings that the identification by the owner was
admissible at trial, while the detention area
identification by the employee was not. However,
the in-court identification by the employee was
held admissible. The court noted that the owner
had observed the unmasked robber under good
lighting conditions, had recalled the robber's
distinctive physical characteristics, had picked
out the defendant in photographs shown to him
the night of the robbery, and had testified that
his in-court identification was not influenced by
the cell block confrontation. The court held this
to be "dear and convincing evidence" that the
in-court identification was independent of the
cell block confrontation.
In Clemons v. United States, the defendant was
convicted on four counts of robbery and four
counts of assault with a dangerous weapon. Four
months after the incident the prosecutor took
three witnesses who had identified the defendant's
photograph on the night of the robbery to the
[Vol. 60
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cellblock where he was being held. The witnesses
were shown only one man, the defendant, and
they knew he was the man being held for the
crime. At this time the witnesses again identified
the defendant as the robber. The cellblock identifi-
cations were admitted at the trial, and the de-
fendant was convicted.
In affirming the conviction, the court rejected
the argument that the Supreme Court's per se
rule in Gilbert excluding out of court identifications
violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
also applies to due process violations, and that
this requires a reversal in this case. It took into
consideration the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether the out of court identifica-
tions admitted into evidence were justified by
other than the cell block confrontations.
An earlier district court case, United States v.
Washington, 292 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1968),
ruled that a pre-trial identification found violative
of due process could not be the basis for a later
in-court identification unless the prosecution
could prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the in-court identification was arrived at by
means "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint". While this decision is con-
sistent in theory with the later Clemmons approach,
the severe burden of proof placed on the govern-
ment in Washington was not in all respects applied
in the latter opinion.
AssisTAcFc or COUNSEL
The following cases have recently been decided
dealing with the effective assistance of counsel:
Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 89 S.Ct. 35 (1968);
People v. McDowell, 447 P.2d 97 (Calif. 1968);
Young v. State, 247 A.2d 751 (Md. 1968); Williams
v. United States, 402 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1968);
McConnel v. Rhay, 89 S.Ct. 32 (1968).
In Arsenault the Supreme Court held that its
previous decision in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
69 (1963), should be applied retroactively. De-
fendant, the day after his arrest, pleaded guilty
to murder at a probable cause hearing without
assistance by counsel. Six days later, still without
counsel, the defendant changed his plea to not
guilty at arraignment. When he came to trial
defendant again pleaded not guilty, this time
with the aid of counsel, but the state questioned
him at trial about his prior statements and guilty
plea to refresh his memory. The jury sentenced
him to death.
In reversing the court said that White, which
also involved an accused's plea of guilty at a
preliminary hearing without the aid of counsel,
was indistinguishable in principle, and that "the
right to counsel at the trial, on appeal and at
other 'critical' stages of the criminal proceeding
have all been made retroactive, since the denial
of the right must invariably deny a fair trial."
In the McDowell case the defendant, on appeal
of a conviction of robbery, assault, burglary and
murder, contended that his counsel did not under-
stand the settled rule in California that evidence
of mental abnormality, not amounting to insanity,
is admissible at the guilt phase of a trial to negate
the specific mental states put in issue by a plea of
not guilty. The court held that defendant was
denied his constitutional right to effective repre-
sentation of counsel.
The court pointed to the California rule that on
trial of the issues raised by a plea of not guilty
to a charge of a crime, which requires proof of a
specific mental state, competent evidence is
admissible to show that because of mental ab-
normality not amounting to legal insanity the
defendant did not possess that mental state at
the time he committed the act. When considered
with counsel's duty to investigate carefully all
defenses of fact and of law that may be available
to the defendant, the court concluded that the
defendant did not have the assistance to which he
was entitled. As a result, the trial was "funda-
mentally unfair" and constituted a denial of due
process of law.
In the Young case, the defendant was tried
for assault and battery before a jury. After retiring
to deliberate the jury requested further instruc-
tions. Neither appellant nor his attorney were
made aware of the request. The judge did deliver
subsequent instructions, without the presence of
appellant or his counsel. Defendant was there-
after found guilty.
The conviction was reversed on appeal because
both the state and federal constitutions "guar-
antee that counsel be present at trial, and embrace
representation throughout the entire trial in all
its stages". Instruction to the jury out of the
presence of appellant and his counsel was a viola-
tion of this guaranty.
Furthermore, the court asserted, the procedure
violated Maryland rules which require that to
assign error as to instructions on appeal the de-
fendant must have objected to the instruction
19691
CASE NOTES
before the jury retires. In the instant case the
attorney had no opportunity to object, since he
lacked any knowledge that the instructions were
being given. Therefore, the defendant's power to
appeal was denied because there was no effective
representation by counsel at this stage of the
proceeding.
Finally, the court noted reversible error because
the appellant was involuntarily absent from the
proceedings when the subsequent instructions
were given. Maryland's Article 5, Declaration
of Rights, in her Constitution, and Rule 775
preserve the common law right for the accused
to be present at every stage of his trial. It is the
defendant's absolute right, which cannot be
waived by counsel, to be present when the jury
is charged. If any other "communication" be-
tween judge and jury other than the judge's
instructions takes place, the defendant must be
present unless "the record affirmatively shows
that such communication was not prejudicial or
had no tendency to influence the verdict of the
jury." Communication involves any intercourse
between judge and jury not dealing with the facts,
the law, or the form of the verdict.
In Williams, the Eight Circuit held that coun-
sel's extraordinary inattention to an indigent's
right to appeal was a denial of his right to the
assistance of counsel. In this case defendant was
found guilty of the unlawful purchase and sale
of heroin. No timely notice of appeal was filed
after this conviction.
Defendant testified that he last saw his court
appointed counsel the day after the verdict was
rendered. The attorney testified that he knew
that appellant wanted to appeal and felt that he
should have appealed. He could not recall any
specific reason for the delay in appeal but did
indicate some uncertainty at the time of the trial
as to the required length of his services. Further-
more, the attorney testified, he told the court
and the defendant that he would not represent
the latter on appeal. Defendant claimed that he
lacked assistance of counsel from the time of the
verdict through the time in which an appeal
could have been perfected.
The court vacated his sentence and remanded
for resentencing; the time for an appeal will be
allowed to run from the date of resentencing. The
couit believed that the lack of counsel at this
critical stage of the trial deprived the defendant
of his constitutional right to the appellate review
of his conviction. The right to assistance of counsel
includes all critical stages of the process from his
initial appearance before the commissioner through
the appellate process. Counsel's failure to file an
appeal is an error of such magnitude that despite
any nominal representation by counsel, the de-
fendant in fact lacked the assistance of counsel.
The court went on to observe that while the
Criminal Justice Act was not effective at the time
of this appeal it would require court appointed
counsel to continue to actively support the indigent
unless and until relieved by the court. Another
rule passed by the court in implementing the
Criminal Justice Act obligates the court appointed
counsel to inform his client of the right to appeal
and to follow defendant's request in regard to
that right.
Finally in the Supreme Court case of McConnel
v. Rhay the court applied the case of Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), retroactively. In
this case two defendants were placed on probation,
one immediately after conviction for burglary
and the other after serving a minimal sentence
for grand larceny. Following their violation of
probation terms both were given two hearings to
fix the terms of their sentences. At none of the
hearings were the defendants represented by
counsel.
In applying the similar Mempa case retro-
actively the court said that the necessity of the
presence of counsel to marshal and present facts
in mitigation of the verdict makes the situation
no different than Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), or any other right to counsel case
applied retroactively since "the right being as-
serted relates to the very integrity of the fact-
finding process."
INDIGENTS
State Duty To Provide Technical Pretrial
Assistance To Indigent Defendants-Houghtaling
v. Commonwealth, 163 S.E.2d 560 (Va. 1968);
Foster v. Commonwealth, 163 S.E.2d 565 (Va.
1968); San Miguel v. McCarthy, 446 P.2d 22
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1968). These three cases probe
the scope of the implication in Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1953), that the indigent is
entitled to be furnished with various forms of aid
other than counsel. In Houghtaling, the defendant
on trial for first degree murder moved for the state
to furnish funds for conducting an independent
psychiatric examination. Two psychiatrists and
[Vol. 60
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a psychologist from the state hospital where the
defendant was committed for observation testified
for the state. In Foster, a burglary suspect moved
for the court to surrender clothing that had been
chemically examined by the F.B.I. and to pay the
cost of an independent chemical examination.
And in San Miguel, the defendant moved for the
court to appoint an investigator at state expense.
All three motions were denied at the trial and on
appeal.
The Virginia court in Houghtaling felt that the
constitutional claim was disposed of by United
States v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). However, the
petitioner's claim in the latter case was not that
the state must provide for an independent psy-
chiatric examination but that the state must
conduct its psychiatric examination before a hear-
ing on whether the defendant committed the act.
The claim for an independent technical ap-
praisal was faced in Foster, which was handed down
the same day as Houghtaling. The court found that
since there was no challenge to the validity of the
F.B.I. tests and since the results of these tests,
performed by an "expert, independent and im-
partial agency" were made available to the de-
fendant's counsel, he was not deprived of adequate
information to prepare the defense.
It is unfortunate that the court in Houghtaling
misplaced its reliance on Baldi. The facts in
Houghtaling may establish a stronger case of
inequality between rich and poor than those in
Douglas v. California. Most defendants would
probably rather have a psychiatrist in their corner
when the state must prove sanity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt than have appointed counsel on
appeal.
Public Defender's Determination Of Indigency
Of Defendant Not Reviewable By Trial Court-
Ingram v. Justice Court For Lake Valley Judicial
District, 73 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1968). In 1959 peti-
tioner Ingram pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor
charge without the aid of counsel and did not
appeal. On Aug. 21, 1967 the public defender,
representing petitioner, filed notice of motion
to set aside the prior conviction on the ground
that petitioner was denied right to counsel. At
the hearing the court asked the public defender
to provide an affidavit establishing petitioner's
indigence. Public defender refused, maintaining
that he did not have one and was not required
by law to provide such an affidavit. He stated
that he was satisfied that petitioner was financially
unable to employ private counsel. The court,
however, ruled that it had the power and duty to
make the final determination of indigence. Peti-
tioner then filed application for writ of mandate
contending that the court's ruling was in excess of
its jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California
affirmed the El Dorado Superior Court granting
the writ. The governing statute (Government
Code §27706) provides that "Upon request of
the defendant or upon order of the court the [public
defender] shall defend.., any person who is not
financially able to employ counsel... ", and the
court held that allowing the trial court to review
the public defender's determination of indigency
following a defendant's request for service would
in effect, eliminate that alternative and defeat the
legislative purpose.
In addition, the court pointed out that when a
defendant appears in court with counsel it would
be a violation of the attorney-client privilege for
the court to intrude into the nature of their
financial arrangement. The function of reviewing
the public defender's rightful exercise of discretion
in determining the indigence of a given defendant
is political, not judicial, in nature.
Finally, the fact that this was not technically a
defense but rather a motion to set aside a prior
conviction was held to be immaterial. The court
construed the statute (Government Code §27706)
which provides for services "... at all stages of
the proceeding... " to extend to petitioner's
right to the public defender's assistance in this
situation.
JUVENILEs AND JUVENILE COURTS
Rights Of Juveniles After Gault-State v.
Steinhauer, 216 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1968); Neller v.
State, 445 P.2d 949 (N.M. 1968); De Backer v.
Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508 (Neb. 1968). Recent
attempts of state courts to apply the dictates of
the Supreme Court concerning the rights of
juveniles-In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)-illus-
trate that there is no uniform interpretation by
the states as to what those dictates are.
In both Steinhauer and Neller the issue before
the court was the right of a juvenile to have counsel
at the proceeding conducted for the purpose of
transferring him from juvenile court to criminal
court. Steinhauer voluntarily waived jurisdiction
of the juvenile court during a waiver hearing at
CASE NOTES
which he was not represented by counsel, while
Neller was transferred to criminal court by the
juvenile court judge during a hearing at which he
also had no counsel.
Even though in Steinhauer the state conceded
that Gault required counsel at such proceedings-
thus leaving only the issue of retroactive applica-
tion (Steinhauer had been convicted after Kent
but before Gault)-the court in dictim noted that
Gault dictated such a result. The Neller court,
however, did not view Gault as altering the Kent
holding "so as to make the requirement one of
constitutional dimensions". (Kent held that under
the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act and
the requirements of due process, a juvenile was
entitled to counsel at waiver proceedings.) It
assumed without deciding that Kent (not Gault,
as in the Steinhaver case) required counsel in
waiver proceedings and then decided the case on
the theory that even if Neller had the right, he
had waived it by not objecting.
After examining Supreme Court cases which
deal with the question of retroactive application,
the court in Steinhauer held that Gault should not
be applied retroactively since the waiver pro-
ceeding did not involve any fact-finding and thus
did not "substantially affect the guilt or innocence
of the juvenile".
The Neller decision may well confuse future
cases in New Mexico as a result of the shotgun
approach of its opinion. The basis of the decision
would have been clear if the court had stopped
with its finding that if Neller had a right to counsel,
he waived it when he was represented by counsel
in the criminal proceeding and at that time made
no objection to his prior lack of counsel. The court
went on, however, to examine the merits of Neller's
contention. "Observing" that a juvenile was
denied no rights accorded to an adult by being
denied counsel at a waiver hearing, the court
concluded that nothing "constitutionally requires
that [a juvenile] receive anything more or better
than is accorded an adult". In apparent contradic-
tion to this statement the court went on to say
that "if at the time of arraignment, complaint
had been made that counsel had not been provided
in juvenile court we consider it would possibly
have been error for the district court to refuse to
remand to the juvenile court for a proper hearing".
The implication is that a "proper hearing"
would be one with the assistance of counsel. As a
result of its confusing opinion, the New Mexico
Supreme Court will have to decide in the future
if Gault requires counsel at a waiver proceeding.
In the De Backer case, the issue before the
Nebraska Supreme Court was whether a juvenile
should be granted habeas corpus because he had
been denied a jury trial in a juvenile court pro-
ceeding which resulted in his commitment to a
training school. A majority of the court (four out
of the seven justices) found the petitioner's con-
stitutional challenge to be valid, but its holding
was barred from taking effect by Article V, Sec.
2, of the Nebraska Constitution, which provides
in part, that "no legislative act shall be held
unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five
judges".
The majority found Gault controlling in that an
"implicit foundation" of the Gault decision is that
juvenile proceedings are "sufficiently criminal
in nature" so that due process constitutional
rights must be applied. Acknowledging that the
issue of the right to jury trial was not before the
Court in Gault, the majority viewed Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which was decided
after Gault, as requiring that a defendant be
given the right to a jury trial in state courts in
"serious criminal cases". Thus, by application of
Gault and Duncan, the majority concluded that a
juvenile has the same rights as an adult has and
therefore De Backer had the right to a jury in the
juvenile proceeding. The majority also upheld
the further contention that the charges against
De Backer had to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the
evidence, as had been held in the juvenile pro-
ceeding.
The minority opinion is interesting but seriously
questionable. Both Gault and Duncan were nar-
rowly construed to support the minority's conclu-
sion. Since Gault did not hold that the right of
trial by jury is essential to due process (the Court
could not so hold since that issue was not before
the Court), and since Duncan dealt with a criminal
case and not a juvenile proceeding, the minority
reasoned that a juvenile in a juvenile court pro-
ceeding is not guaranteed the right to trial by jury.
Such a conclusion ignores, or attempts to ignore,
the obvious import of the Gault and Duncan
decisions. Gault strongly points out the Court's
intention that whatever is required by due process
should be applicable also in juvenile court pro-
ceedings. In the words of the court, "it would
be extraordinary if our Constitution did not re-
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quire procedural regularity and the exercise of
care implied in the phrase 'due process'."
The concept of due process provides the link
between the Gault and Duncan decisions, for
Duncan's application of the right to a trial by
jury in state courts was made within the context
of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
Thus it would appear obvious that the due process
requirements, broadened by the right to trial by
jury as a result of Duncan, are applicable to
juvenile court proceedings on the basis of Gault.
The minority attempts to justify its conclusion
by the questionable argument that:
It is the function of this court to protect
its own jurisdiction against encroachment. It
is my firm opinion that this court ought not to
yield up its own powers to the Supreme Court
of the United States until such court has made
a final and binding judgment that can be
imposed on this court under the doctrine of
judicial supremacy....
... The fact that a judge is a member of
the highest court of the nation or state is not,
of itself, proof of infallibility of decision. It
might be well for members of such courts, on
occasion, to step down from their ivory towers
and recall with some humility that they were
at the time of their appointment better than
average lawyers with little judicial experience,
of which there are many, who knew a Presi-
dent or Governor. In drafting the Constitution
of the United States, our forefathers did not
provide the states with a practical means of
combating misconstruction of the Constitu-
tion or encroachment of federal authority
upon the sovereign power of the states....
I shall neither bend the knee nor bow the head
on mere inferences, speculations, or proba-
bilities as to what that court will eventually
do.
TRUL PiAcMcE AND PROCEDMURE
Court's Instructions Extolling Police Held To
Be In Error-State v. Jones, 248 A.2d 554 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1968). Defendants LeRoi Jones, Charles
McCray, and Barry Wynn, were arrested for
unlawful possession of weapons during the Newark
riots in June, 1967. The State's evidence was that
the police had broadcast an alarm to look for a
blue panel truck from which shots were being
fired at police. Police stopped a green Volkswagen
"camper" which Wynn was driving and in which
Jones and McCray were riding. One officer looked
into the camper from the passenger side and saw a
revolver on a shelf below the dashboard and the
three were ordered out of the camper. As Jones
got out a gun fell from his tunic; bullets were
found in Wynn's pockets and in a paper bag inside
the camper.
The defendants contended that the police
fabricated the charges. The defendants argued
that they had no guns and were beaten by the
police because the police mistook them for the
people in a "blue panel truck", or because the
police knew Jones as a militant. As a result of
their beating, they had to be taken to a hospital.
After being convicted by a jury, the defendants
appealed, arguing that the trial court's instruc-
tions were prejudicial in that they went beyond
mere comment on the evidence. Some of the
contested instructions were:
You saw and heard each of these officers
testify. The defendants would have you be-
lieve that they are prevaricators and that
they committed the most flagrant kind of
perjury when they stated under oath the
manner in which they found and removed two
loaded revolvers and the ammunition from
the Volkswagen which the defendants oc-
cupied....
Did they appear to you to be evilly disposed
and wicked men who would resort to such
calumny? Is it conceivable that these five
men in blue would confer and agree together
to commit such an unconscionable and out-
rageous act? In the final analysis, ladies and
gentlemen, what interest did these officers
have at the time of the arTest other than to
restore law and order under extremely haz-
ardous conditions? ...
In the final analysis, ladies and gentlemen,
the police officer is the shield of the community
against the use of violence and other lawless
acts.
While admitting that a judge can express his
opinion on the value and weight of evidence, the
New Jersey Superior Court held the instructions
to be beyond mere comment since "the import of
the charge was not only that the judge believed
the testimony given by the police, but that he
thought the jury should do likewise". Further,
the witnesses should not have been referred to as
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"these five men in blue... for the jury may con-
sider them to be expressions of admiration of the
witnesses and certification of their credibility".
Answering the state's contention that the con-
tested charges were harmless when read in the
context of the entire charge, the court concluded
that "we have studied the entire charge carefully
and find nothing in it which materially ameliorates
the prejudice".
Questions About Prior Convictions Or Arrests
Proper Once Defendant Puts His Character Or
Credibility In Issue-Commonwealth v. Smith, 248
A.2d 24 (Pa. S.Ct. 1968).
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder.
At his trial he testified to two prior convictions
and mitigating circumstances surrounding those
convictions. In cross-examination, the state ques-
tioned defendant about other arrests which his
record revealed but which did not lead to con-
viction. Defendant appealed the conviction on
the ground that the interrogation concerning the
arrests was improper. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed.
The Pennsylvania legislature had passed a
statute in 1911 to curb prosecutorial abuse in
the use of the defendant's prior criminal record
for impeachment purposes. The defendant cannot
be asked nor required to answer any question
tending to show prior criminal activity unless he
has advanced "evidence tending to prove his
own character or reputation". The court here
believed that the testimony offered by the de-
fendant led to an inference that his character was
of good repute. It affirmed the lower court's posi-
tion that once defendant's character is in issue,
questions about arrests not leading to conviction
are proper.
In Commonwealth v. Butler, 247 A.2d 794 (1968),
filed ten days before the Smith opinion, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that only
questions about prior convictions are relevant for
impeachment. Furthermore, only convictions for
felonies, misdemeanors in the nature of crimen
falsi, or crimes similar to those for which the de-
fendant is presently charged are legally relevant
to the issue of credibility. Butler reasoned that
the risk of prejudice is so great in allowing ex-
amination into mere arrests that the practice
should not be allowed. The dissent in Butler
referred to Smith as being dispositive of the issue.
The Butler reasoning is compelling. First, the
purpose of the statute encompasses the problem
presented when a prosecutor cites a long line of
arrests-on the witnesses' records but fails to inform
the jury as to the number of convictions involved.
Second, the judge's, instructions to the jury that
they must use suchevidence only in considering
the credibility of the witness may be ineffective.
This evidence could come to have substantial
weight in the jury's determination of guilt and
the evidence should be limited to the truly proba-
tive and relevant facts.
Defendant Should Be Fully Advised Of His
Right To Appeal-People v. Sanders, 240 N.E. 2d
627 (]1. S.Ct. 1968). Defendant was convicted
of petty theft at a bench trial. Three weeks after
sentencing he petitioned the court for a transcript
of the trial proceedings, which was granted. Six
weeks thereafter he filed a motion with the appel-
late court requesting leave to file a late appeal,
which was denied. Then he moved to have his
request for a transcript of record treated as a
notice of appeal, which was also denied. The
Illinois Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
defendant's claim that this treatment denied him
due process.
The court was concerned with applying Supreme
Court Rule 606 (a), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, c. 1l0A,
sec. 606(a). It held that the rule, which provides
that an appeal is perfected by filing a notice of
appeal with the trial court, made defendant's
claim that the request for transcript should be
treated as a notice of appeal untenable. Rule
606(a) also provides, however, that if defendant
so requests in open court, the clerk of the trial
court will prepare, sign and file a notice of appeal.
In this case, defendant, after sentencing and while
still in open court, asked the court, "Your Honor,
may I appeal this case from in?" and "May I
have a transcript?" No answers were given by
the court.
The Supreme Court held that where a de-
fendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and indi-
cates in some manner his desire to appeal his
conviction, it is the duty of the trial judge to fully
advise the defendant of any such rights he may
have. The court also held that the trial court
clerk's failure to file defendant's notice of appeal
was reasonable excuse for defendant's not filing a
timely notice of appeal. The appellate court's
denial of defendant's request to file a late notice
of appeal was reversed.
Uncontradicted Hearsay Testimony Held Suffl.
cient To Establish Guilt-People v. McCoy, 242
N.E.2d 4 (Ill. App.Ct. 1968). Defendant was con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter at a bench
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trial, was admitted to probation, with a one-year
sentence at the Illinois State Farm as one of the
probationary terms. Defendant appealed from the
judgment of guilty, alleging that the evidence
did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
because the only evidence heard by the court was
hearsay.
At trial, the State's Attorney testified that he
had heard witnesses testify at the coroner's in-
quest. He told the events as told to him, gave
the names of all witnesses and stated that all
these facts could be established by nonhearsay
testimony. The facts, if true, warranted conviction.
Defendant's counsel did not object to the State's
Attorney's testimony, after which the prosecution
rested. The State's Attorney's testimony was the
only evidence the prosecution put forward, but
defendant's counsel made no motion for a verdict
of not guilty because of insufficiency. Both sides
waived argument on the issue of guilt and the
only disagreement concerned the length of the
jail sentence.
The court framed the issue as whether uncon-
tradicted hearsay testimony, received without
objection and standing alone, may establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court answered
the issue in the affirmative.
Hearsay evidence, the court said, can be of
probative value, a fact from which its being hear-
say does not detract. If no objection is made, the
evidence is to be considered and weighed as if it
were legally admissible. The trial court weighed
the evidence, which was ample, and no argument
was had on the issue of guilt. The court held that
the defendant stipulated to the facts testified to
by the State's Attorney and that once the facts
were stipulated into the record, defendant cannot
complain about them. The defendant could have
objected, but did not. The conviction was affirmed.
One judge dissented, expressing the view that
hearsay alone will not support a finding of guilty-
in a criminal case. Hearsay is excluded because it
is unreliable. It is a rule of evidence and can be
waived, but even if admitted, it is still unreliable.
No case suggests that hearsay alone will support a
criminal felony conviction, although it may be
enough to sustain a civil judgment. As for de-
fendant's stipulation, the dissent felt that he
actually did not stipulate to anything. Failure
to object to evidence is not a stipulation to its
truth.
Testimony Adduced By Hypnosis Suficient
To Support Rape Conviction When Corroborated-
NOTES 225
Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302 (Ct. Spec. App.
Md. 1968). The defendant was convicted of assault
with intent to rape, and of assault with intent to
murder. His conviction on the rape charge was
based almost exclusively on evidence received
from the prosecutrix while under hypnosis. The
defendant contended that this was inadmissible
evidence.
The court affirmed the conviction. It found that
the testimony of the prosecutrix was based upon
her own recollections. The fact that she had related
the knowledge after being hypnotized "concerns
the question of the weight of the evidence which
the trier of facts, in this case the jury, must de-
cide". However, the court explicitly refused to go
beyond the facts of the case in allowing the evi-
dence to stand. It saw the other facts as vital to
the question of admissibility. The instructions
to the jury included a precaution not to place any
greater weight on her testimony than on any other
evidence. Furthermore, a full disclosure by the
hypnotist of the theory of hypnosis and a complete
description of the hypnosis procedure was brought
out in testimony. In addition, the court found
sufficient corroboration of the witness' testimony
to support the evidence adduced by hypnosis.
MISCELLANEOUS
Application of Witherspoon with Different
Results-People v. Beivelman, 447 P.2d 913
(Cal. 1968); People v. Risenhoover, 447 P.2d 925
(Cal. 1968); State v. Spence, 164 S.E.2d 593 (N.C.
1968). The defendants contended that the exclu-
sion of jurors conscientiously opposed to the
death penalty violated the holding of the Supreme
Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968).
In Beivelman. the court held the three excluded
jurors were legally excluded according to the
Witherspoon standards. The voir dire examination
questions focused on the issue of whether the
specific juror could not impose the death penalty
no matter what the evidence might be. For ex-
ample, the following questions were answered
affirmatively by the first, second, and third pro-
spective jurors, respectively:
... Now do you think that your state of
mind is such that you could in no case vote
the death penalty no matter how culpable
or how bad you felt it was?
... No matter what the case or what the
evidence, I take it... from your stated
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opinion that you would not be able to assess
the death penalty?
... [A]gain is that a feeling which would
preclude from-in any case, despite the
evidence and despite the circumstances, as a
matter of conscience, from imposing the death
penalty as a juror?
While eight jurors were excluded in Risen-
hoover, the court only cited the following voir dire
examination of one prospective juror as one of the
grounds for reversal:
The Court:... Can you think of anything
that would cause you to be ... other than a
fair and impartial juror if you were to be
selected? Mrs. Friese: Well, I don't know if
I could possibly deal with the death sentence.
The Court:... Do you hold such a conscien-
tious opinion on the death penalty as would
preclude you from concurring in a verdict
carrying the death penalty?... Mrs. Friese:
Well, probably. I don't feel I would have
the ... The Court: Very well. Thank you,
and you may be excused...
The court reasoned that the trial judge's failure
to allow the prospective juror to complete her
answers meant it was not ..... 'unmistakably
clear' that she 'would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment without
regard to any evidence that might be developed
at the trial.'" (citing Witherspoon, supra, at 522,
n. 21).
The court in Risenhoover affirmed the verdict
of guilty, finding that the evidence supported the
verdict, and remanded for a new hearing limited
to the issue of penalty.
In State v. Spence, the court found that the
jurors selected did not meet the Witherspoon
criteria. In reversing the decision, the court studied
three suggestions: 1) the verdict should be set
aside; 2) only the death penalty should be elimi-
nated; and 3) the case should be remanded for
life imprisonment. The court in setting aside
both the penalty and the verdict, held that the
defendant's plea of not guilty raised jury questions
and only the jury, not the court, could return a
verdict of guilty.
Failure Of Police Protection Not Grounds For
Tort Liability-Riss v. City of New York, 22
N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. App. 1968).
Plaintiff was terrorized for more than six months
by a rejected suitor, who threatened to have her
killed or maimed if she did not yield to him. She
went to the police, who gave little assistance. At
a party celebrating her engagement to another
man, she received a telephone call telling her that
it was her "last chance". The police still refused to
help. The next day, the ex-suitor had someone
throw lye in her face, partially blinding her and
permanently scarring her. Thereafter, the city
gave her around-the-clock protection. Plaintiff
sued the city, alleging that it negligently failed
to protect her from harm. The Supreme Court
dismissed the complaint and the Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed.
The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The court, per Breitel, J., said that for
the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of
protection in tort law, even to those who specifi-
cally seek protection against specific dangers,
would inevitably determine how the limited police
resources of the community should be allocated
and without predictable limits. This is different,
the court said, from the predictable allocation of
resources and liabilities when public hospitals,
rapid transit systems or even highways are pro-
vided. Extension of liability would result in grave
consequences to the municipality and such exten-
sion should be made, if at all, by the legislature,
not the courts.
Keating, J., dissented. He felt the municipality
should be subject to liability for negligence in this
case. Municipalities would neither go bankrupt
nor would frivolous suits prevail, since the lia-
bility is not absolute. The police need only act
as reasonable men would under the circumstances.
At first there would be a duty to inquire. If the
inquiry indicates nothing to substantiate the
alleged threat, the matter may be put aside and
other matters attended to. If, however, the claims
prove to have some basis, appropriate steps would
be necessary. To the argument that the police
are understaffed, Keating's answer is that to the
extent that the injury results from the failure to
allocate sufficient funds and resources to meet a
minimum standard of public administration, public
officials are presented with two alternatives:
either improve public administration or accept
the cost of compensating injured persons.
Conviction For First Degree Murder Reduced
To Second Degree In Absence Of Proof Of Pre-
meditation Or Specific Intent In Felony-Murder-
People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. S.Ct. 1968).
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder
for the homicide of a ten year old girl. Circum-
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stantial evidence tended to show that the de-
fendant chased the victim around a house, tearing
her clothes off while slashing her with a knife.
The court reduced the degree of the conviction to
second degree murder.
The court held that the evidence was insufficient
to support a conclusion of either a) premeditation,
or b) felony-murder. To find premeditation, there
must be evidence of (1) the defendant's action
prior to the killing which dearly showed "plan-
ning" to kill, (2) a "motive" for the homicide,
and (3) a manner of killing which showed beyond
a reasonable doubt that the wounds were inten-
tionally inflicted to cause death. The prosecution
failed to meet this burden.
The felony-murder basis was also unfounded in
convicting in the first degree. The felony relied
upon by the prosecution was the performance or
attempted performance of a lewd or lascivious
act upon the body of a child. In order to establish
that the defendant committed the killing during
the perpetration of the felony, the prosecution
must prove that the defendant harbored the spe-
cific intent to commit that felony. Also, the evi-
dence must prove that the defendant had this
specific intent either prior to or during the com-
mission of the acts which resulted in death. In the
present case, no evidence was presented which
tended to prove that the defendant had ever
formed any sexual feelings toward, or engaged in
any kind of lewd conduct with, the victim or any
other person.
Retarded 12-Year-Old Incapable Of Committing
Sex Crime-It Re G. M. R., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2276
(Calif. Ct. App. 1968). Defendant was a twelve-year-
old girl with an I.Q. of 71 and the social compre-
hension of a seven year old. After being found
molesting a two year old girl, she was declared a
ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section
602 of the Welfare and Institution Code of Cal-
ifornia. Under that statute, a juvenile who com-
mits any crime may be declared a ward of the
court. This judgment was reversed by the Appel-
late Court.
The court read the juvenile act in conjunction
with the state Penal Code. Under section 26 of
the Penal Code, a child under fourteen years of
age cannot be convicted of a sex crime without
"clear proof" that a wrong was being committed.
The court found no evidence that the defendant
had knowledge of any wrongness in her act.
Although the child in this case might require
the treatment and supervision provided by the
state, she may not be committed by being stigma-
tized as a delinquent. The juvenile court is not
precluded, however, from making the child a ward
of the court under other provisions of the juvenile
act, if there is evidence supporting such action.
Narcotics Conviction Requires Proof of Usable
Amount-State v. Urios, 4415 P.2d 18 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1968). The defendant was convicted for the
illegal possession of a little over one gram of a
substance containing 18% heroine. He appealed
on the ground, inter alia, that the state must
show that the amount in possession was a usable
amount. The Court of Appeals relying on State v.
Moreno, 374 P.2d 872 (Ariz. 1962), agreed. Al-
though the conviction in Moreno was sustained on
only .2 of one milligram, the Court of Appeals
found that Moreno requires positive evidence as
to the sufficiency of the narcotics to be usable
under the known practices of narcotics addicts.
The court, however, recognized that such a proof
would be superfluous where the quantity was so
large that its usability would be "patently ob-
vious" to the uninformed laymen.
Carrying Broken Pistol Not Violative Of Statute
Prohibiting Possession Of Concealed Firearms-
People v. Jackson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Calif. S.Ct.
1968). Defendant was convicted of feloniously
possessing a concealable firearm after suffering a
prior felony conviction. On appeal the conviction
was reversed on the grounds that the firearm, a
pistol, was not in operating condition, and could
not have been made operable without the pro-
curement of a replacement part.
The court noted that the purpose of the statute
prohibiting possession of concealable weapons by
persons previously convicted of a felony is to make
unlawful the carrying of guns that will shoot, and
not merely objects that look like useable guns. A
gun that is temporarily inefficient, or dismembered
in such a way that it could be easily assembled,
would fall within the prohibition of the statute.
Here, however, in the absence of a showing that
the necessary replacement part was in the pos-
session of the defendant and that a simple substi-
tution could have made the weapon operable,
there was no violation of the statute.
Whipping Of Prisoners Is Cruel And Unusual
Punishment-Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968). The Eighth Circuit reversed a district
court denial of an injunction, on appeal by an
Arkansas penitentiary inmate, to enjoin the use of
a whip for prison discipline.- The whip in question
consisted of a leather strap, 3M to,5Y2 feet long,
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4 inches wide, Y4 inch thick and mounted on a
wooden handle 8 to 12 inches long. Newly effec-
tuated prison regulations (January, 1966) re-
stricted the whip's use to administrations by the
warden upon the buttocks of a fully clothed in-
mate.
The court, finding that these supposedly re-
strictive regulations were 'subject to great abuse,
did not limit itself to condemning that abuse but
condemned the whole practice of corporal punish-
ment as a means of enforcing prison discipline.
The court considered irrelevant the state's argu-
ment that whipping was the only economically
feasible punishment. Faced with evidence of whip-
pings administered by prisoners on the bare but-
tocks of fellow inmates, the court noted that
whenever corporal punishment is authorized it is
subject to abuse. The court also noted that where
authorization and administration are separated by
several administrative levels, the difficulties of
enforcement of the regulations become prohibitive.
The court stated that it was indisputable that
the use of studded or spiked whips, great frequency
of whipping, inappropriate methods and too long a
duration of whipping were cruel and unusual pun-
ishments under the Eighth Amendment. Com-
bining this and the administrative difficulties of
preventing unauthorized whippings with the cur-
rent status of public opinion on whipping (only
two states permit its use) the court declared that
whipping itself, and in any form, was a cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.
Threat Against Life Of The President Not Pro.
tected By First Amendment-Watts v. United
States, 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968). At a DuBois
Club meeting dealing with police brutality the
defendant said that he would refuse induction
into the armed services and that "if they ever
make me carry a rifle the first person I want...
in my sights is LBJ." The meeting was a few
hundred yards from the White House. Defendant
was convicted for threatening the life of the Presi-
dent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871.
In affirming the conviction the court emphasized
that it is the mere making of a threat and not the
intent to carry it out that constitutes a violation of
the law. The history behind the bill is ambiguous
but it does indicate that it was not meant to
create a specific intent crime. The bill was to deter
both threat-making as well as the consequences of
threat-making which would include the incitement
of others. If the government shows that the de-
clarant understood -the meaning of his words and
that he uttered themn voluntarily and with an
apparent intention to carry them into -execution,
then it has demonstrated a violation of the statute.
There is no requirement that the person making
the threat intend to carry it out; the court even
indicates that saying the words in jest may not be
a defense.
The threat in this case was conditional but that
does not remove it from the scope of the statute.
The appearance of present intent was not removed
since the stated condition was fully within the
defendant's control. Whether or not the words
merely expressed a desire and not a threat is a
jury question and calls for the consideration of all
relevant circumstances surrounding the utterance.
Yet,-even though the defendant contended that
his statement was met with laughter and applause,
it is not unreasonable to still infer that they ac-
cepted his words as a threat.
Furthermore, the court stated that "the First
Amendment does not prevent proscription of
utterances that comprise knowing and willful
threats to the life or safety of the President."
The balance to be weighed is between the char-
acter of the individual activity to be regulated
and the value to the public of the ends sought.
These threats could restrict the President's ability
to fulfill his duties. A threat of this nature may
incite others to act. Threats against the life of a
President are dearly distinguishable from those
against a private citizen due to the man's position
in the functioning of our country. These consider-
ations present a "valid basis for reasonable limita-
tion on speech."
The dissent argued that only a threat made
with the specific intent to carry it out would be a
violation of the statute. Threats are protected by
the First Amendment if they carry "an idea" or
an opinion on "how public affairs should be run."
The dissent would have the jury decide whether
or not the threat was made with the specific intent
required. Then the judge should apply the clear
and present danger test to the context in which
the words were uttered. If the words in their con-
text were not an "unambiguous threat" on the
President's life, then the conviction mustfall.
Tip About Known Gun Carriers Justifies Stop
And Frisk-Ballou v. Massachusetts, 403 F.2d 982
(1st Cir. 1958). Police officers were informed by an
anonymous and untested informer that the de-
fendant and several other individuals, all known
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to the police as gangsters with a propensity for
carrying guns, were armed and in a local cafe.
After receiving this information the police officers
sought out the defendant and subjected him to a
"limited, pat-down search".
The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit upheld the legality of the search
under the test of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
and Silbram v. N. Y., 392 U.S. 41 (1968). The court
said that the informer's failure to identify himself
and his lack of proven reliability might have been
significant had the information applied to indi-
viduals unknown to the police. However, the court
held that what the police already knew about the
gangsters, independent of what the informer told
them, brought this case within a "narrowly drawn
authority" to engage in a limited search for weap-
ons... when an officer, on the basis of "specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience," has
"reason to believe he is dealing with an armed




THE TRIAL OF STEVEN TRUSCOTT. By Isabel
LeBourdais. 3. B. Lippincott Company, 1966.
Pp. 257. $4.95.
There was a time when propaganda was respect-
able. Before it acquired its current disrepute, the
term signified writings designed to arouse readers
to action, without reference to the relative virtue
of the cause. It served to distinguish this type of
writing from that which was meant to entertain or
to educate. Now the language lacks a name for it,
but the phenomenon persists. Mrs. LeBourdais'
book is a case in point. It is a first-class piece of
responsible propaganda; remarkable in fact, be-
cause, up to a point, it was very effective.
The Trial of Steven Truscott was first published
in 1965, six years after Truscott, aged 14, was
sentenced at Goderich, Ontario, to death by hang-
ing for the rape-murder of a 12-year-old girl. Isabel
LeBourdais' feeling of horror about the fact that a
Canadian court in the Twentieth century imposed
the death penalty on a child, particularly in the
face of a recommendation of mercy from the jury,
led her to spend years in painstaking research into
the case. She became acquainted with Truscott,
whose sentence had been commuted to life impris-
onment, and, along with his family, she became
convinced of his innocence.
The results of Mrs. LeBourdais' interest and her
efforts developed in stages. First, she found herself
the author of a best-seller that was criticized in
most quarters as being flawed by the current of
emotionalism flowing through its pages. News-
papers and television fostered the growing clamor
for something to be done. The problem was what
to do, for Truscott had exhausted all remedies
Canadian law afforded him. In an unprecedented
action, the Governor-General, who represents the
Queen in Canada, referred the case to the Supreme
Court of Canada for a review of any question of
law, fact, or mixed fact and law, on a considera-
tion of the existing record and such further evidence
as the court saw fit to receive.
Twelve year old Lynne Harper was last seen
alive riding northward from the school grounds on
the handlebars of Steven Truscott's bicycle on a
busy county road near Clinton Air Force Base
somewhere between 7:15 and 7:35 on the evening
of June 9th, 1959. Two days later her body was
found in a clump of trees locally known as the Bush
which lies off the County Road at a point north
of where she was seen with Steven. He claimed
that he had taken her to the northern end of the
Road well past the Bush and cycled back alone.
Stopping on his return ride, he said, he had looked
toward the place where he left her and had seen
her getting into a grey car with yellow plates. The
testimony of witnesses who saw him with her north
of the Bush and alone on his way back was in dis-
pute in the case. It was not disputed, however, that
he was again in the schoolyard, normal in appear-
